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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Authority	NHO 901038
By	HR-m / WSD NARA Date 1/22/91

HR - Mr. Long

S/S 6337

Berlin Contingency Planning

Attached for appropriate action in HR is a letter of August 6 to Mr. Murphy from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Knight, enclosing a memorandum ("Berlin Contingency Planning") of July 29 to Mr. Murphy from Gen. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

File 901038-74

D
R. W. Duemling
S/S-RO
Ext. 4154

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

901038 - 74



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

29 JUL 1959
JCSM-296-59

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

1. This is in further reply to your letter to General Twining, dated 11 July 1959, regarding additional military preparatory measures.

2. Reference is made to USCINCEUR message EC9-10949, which contains the thoughts of a Live Oak Committee composed of French, British, and U.S. General and Flag Officers that prepared a list of actions that could be taken by the tripartite powers to help persuade the USSR of Allied determination.

3. In considering the tripartite views, your attention is invited to the list of forty-five actions contained in the Annex attached to USCINCEUR's message. These include a number of measures that have previously been submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While these measures are considered to be valid to show our determination, the maximum effect could only be expected under conditions where both military and non-military measures were closely coordinated and not executed in isolation. Further, the implementation of only military measures in isolation may not be sustainable for an extended period of time, and could result in a weakening of our posture to retaliate against a surprise attack.

4. As pointed out by the committee of French, British and U.S. officers, timing of execution is most important to gain the maximum effect. The implementation of any group of military or non-military measures may be based on a breakdown of diplomatic negotiations, or when control has been turned over by the Soviets to the GDR, or our access to Berlin has been blocked, or an event of equivalent significance has taken place.

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These are the contingencies which should lead to the implementation of allied military and non-military measures which would include the deployment of forces, use of Presidential emergency powers, an appropriate degree of mobilization, and increased emphasis on measures that would make more evident our readiness for any additional courses of action that may be necessary.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

~~SECRET~~